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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Section 7 8 - 1 4 - 4 M ) •

No malpractice actioi i against a health care provider may
be brought unless it is commenced within two years after
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury f whichever first occurs, but not to exceed
the four years after the date of the alleged act,
omissior
neglect
. occurrence
'"^.ohasis added.
Por • ' • >m i t * ^a } <

No malpractice action against, a health care provider may
be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the
prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at
least ninety days prior notice of intent to commence an
action. Such notice shall include a general statement
of the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the
date,
time
and place
=-f \ se
occurrence, the
circumstances
thereof,
^o^i-ific
allegations
of
misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the
nature of '.he alleged injuries and other damages
sustained.
Motice may be -^ '\ette;r affidavit form
executed L^
*-.'. *Mf:f ",\ ^ o~- a:r-o-no**Service

shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the
manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
for the service of the summons and complaint in a civil
action or by certified mail, return receipt requested,
in which case notice shall be deemed to have been served
within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice
action against a health care provider. If the notice is
served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of
the applicable time period, the time for commencing the
malpractice action against the health care provider
shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service
of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its
retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the
limitation on the time for commencing any action, and
shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after
April 1, 1976. This section shall not apply to third
party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a
health care provider. [Emphasis added].
Section 78-14-12:
(1)
The Department of Business Regulations shall
provide a hearing panel in alleged medical malpractice
cases against health care providers as defined in
Section 78-14-3 filed after July 1, 1985.
The
department shall establish procedures for prelitigation
consideration of personal injury and wrongful death
claims for damages arising out of the provision of or
alleged failure to provide health care. The proceedings
are informal and nonbinding, but are compulsory as a
condition
precedent
to
commencing
litigation.
Proceedings conducted under authority of this section
are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil
process.
(2) The party initiating the medical malpractice action
shall file a request for prelitigation panel review with
the Department of Business Regulations within 60 days
after the filing of a statutory notice of intent to
commence action under Section 78-14-8.
The request
shall include a copy of the notice of intent to commence
action. The request shall be mailed to all health care
providers named in the notice and request.
-2-

(3)
The filing of a request for prel i tig at ion panel
review under this Section tolls the applicable statute
of limitations until 60 days following the issuance of
an opinion by the prelitigation panel.
The opinion
shall be sent to all parties by certified mail, return
receipt requested. [Emphasis added].
Sect i< :

. 1 :

No recocd of the proceedings is required . --' 1
evidence documents, and exhibits are returned zo ir.e
parties or witnesses who provided
the evidence,
documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings.
The hearing panel has the authority to issue subpoenas
and to administer oaths, and any expenses incurred by
the panel in this regard are paid by the requesting
party, including, but not limited to, witness fees and
mileage. The proceedings are informal and formal rules
of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery
or perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except
upon special order of the panel, and for good cause
shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstvices.
(2) A party is entitled to attend, personally -r with
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except upon
special order of the panel and unanimous agreement of
the parties.
The proceedings are confidential and
closed to the public. No party shall have the ''13-;= to
cross-examine,
rebut,
or
demand
that
customary
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be
followed.
The panel may, however, request special or
supplemental participation of some or all parties in
particular respects. Communications between the panel
and the parties, except the testimony of the parties on
the merits of the dispute, are disclosed t^ 31 "• -^.r.er
parties,
(3)
The Department of Business Regulations shall
appoint a panel to consider the claim and set the matter
for panel review as soon as practicable after receipt of
a request.
(4)
Parties may be represents
e^^ol
i
proceedings before a panel. [Emphasis added] .. -

in

Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7. No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of Case:

Plaintiff appeals the Order of

Judge Michael R. Murphy dated November 10, 1988 which dismissed
his claim against all defendants on the grounds plaintiff had
failed to timely file his Complaint under the provisions of the
Utah

Health

Care

plaintiff, by

Malpractice

filing

his

Act.

complaint

The
prior

Court
to

found

that

a Prelitigation

review of the case, violated the express provisions of U.C.A. §
73-14-12

which

malpractice

requires

cases

as

a

a

Prelitigation

condition

review

precedent

of

to

medical

commencing

litigation.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition:
1.

On or about January 31, 1986, plaintiff filed

his Notice of intent to commence a malpractice action against the
defendants named herein.
improper

medical

Plaintiff claimed damages from alleged

treatment

he received

pursuant

to

a skiing

accident which took place on February 1, 1984.
2.

Plaintiff filed a Request for a Prelitigation

review of the case on or about March 4, 1986.

-4-

Before a hearing

could

be

scheduled,

plaintiff

filed

a Complaint

against

the

defendants alleging medical m a l p r a c t i c e .
3.

On December 2,

was held pursuant to p l a i n t i f f ' s
i t s opinion on the same d a t e .

1986, a P r e l i t i g a t i o n

hearing

Request and the Panel rendered

The Panel found p l a i n t i f f ' s

claim

had no m e r i t .
4.

On or about November 4, 1987, defendants Holy

Cross Family Health & Emergency Center, Holy Cross Hospital, Park
City Ambulance and Dr. Winn, f i l e d Motions to dismiss
Complaint based on p l a i n t i f f ' s

i n i t i a t i o n of

the P r e l i t i g a t i o n hearing had been held.

plaintiff's

litigation

before

Judge Brian heard the

Motion on March 7, 1988, and ruled p l a i n t i f f

was e n t i t l e d to a

second P r e l i t i g a t i o n hearing and the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s would
not be t o l l e d u n t i l a f u l l

review had been taken.

Judge Brian

a l s o continued defendants' Motions to dismiss without d a t e .
5.
Prelitigation

On

hearing

July 12, 1988.

or

about

July

6,

1988,

a

second

was held and an opinion was rendered on

The P r e l i t i g a t i o n Panel again found

plaintiff's

claim was without m e r i t .
6.

During the l a t e r part of September, 1988, a l l

defendants f i l e d Motions to dismiss p l a i n t i f f ' s
grounds the Complaint had been prematurely f i l e d .
set

for

hearing

on

October

3,
-5-

1988

Complaint on the
The Motion was

and was continued

until

October 17, 1988 at plaintiff's request.

The Motion was heard by

Judge Michael R. Murphy on October 17, 1988, and Judge Murphy
dismissed

plaintiff's

Complaint

because

it was

not

filed

in

accordance with the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.
7.

Plaintiff filed the instant appeal on December

12, 1988.
C.

Statement of Facts;
1.

On or about February

1, 1984, plaintiff was

involved in a skiing accident and received medical care from the
defendants.

(Record, page 1-12).
2.

Plaintiff filed a Notice of intent to commence

malpractice action on January 31, 1986.
3.

Defendant

Howe

(Exhibit "A").

requested

review of his claim on March 4, 1986.
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-14-12.
4.
malpractice

a

Prelitigation

This request was made

(Exhibit "B" ) .

Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging medical

against the defendants on May 23, 1986.

(Record,

page 1-12).
5.

Defendant Howe filed an Answer to plaintiff's

Complaint on June 20, 1986.
6.
stipulated
plaintiff's

the

(Record, page 28).

On

or

about

time

for

holding

claim,

as

required
-6-

July
a
by

3,

1986,

Prelitigation
U.C.A.

§

the

parties

hearing

on

78-14-13(3), be

extended for successive thirty (30) day periods until a hearing
could be scheduled by the Division of Occupational & Professional
Licensing.

(Record, page 32).
7.

Prelitigation
Occupational

Pursuant

Panel

plaintifffs

of

his

review

& Professional

December 2, 1986.

to

Licensing

request

claim,

the

scheduled

a

Division

of

a hearing for

The Panel rendered its opinion on the same day

and found plaintiff's claim was not meritorious.
8.

for

During

the

first

part

(Exhibit "C").

of

April,

1986,

defendants, Holy Cross Family

& Emergency Center, Holy Cross

Hospital, Park City Ambulance

and Dr. Winn, filed Motions to

dismiss plaintiff's claim.

The Motions were grounded on the fact

that plaintiff had filed his Complaint prior to a Prelitigation
Panel

review of his case

in violation of U.C.A.

§ 78-14-12.

(Record, page 39).
9.
before

Judge

Defendants'

Brian on

Motions

March

7,

to

1988.

dismiss
The

were

Judge

argued

continued

defendants' Motions without date and allowed plaintiff to request
a second Prelitigation Panel review.
were reserved.

The defendants' Motions

(Record, page 84).
10.

A

second

Prelitigation

scheduled for hearing on July 6, 1988.

-7-

Panel

review

The Panel issued its

was

opinion on July 12th and found plaintiff's Complaint to be nonmeritorious.

(Exhibit "D").
11.

On

withdrew as counsel.
12.
1988, plaintiff
counsel.

August

25,

1988,

plaintiff's

attorney

(Record, page 87).

On August 29, 31 and again on September 23,
was

notified

to appear

in person or appoint

(Record, pages 89, 94, and 96).
13.

In

late

September

of

1988, all

defendants

filed Motions to dismiss on the grounds plaintiff's Complaint had
been prematurely

filed in violation of U.C.A. § 78-14-12.

hearing

Motions

on

the

was

scheduled

for

October

A

3, 1988.

(Record, page 99-124).
14.
Coalville

on

On October 3, 1988, the parties appeared in

defendants' Motions

to dismiss.

The

plaintiff

appeared pro se and asked the Court for a continuance so that he
could obtain an attorney.
October 17, 1988.
15.
Coalville

to

defendant,

(Record, page 128, Transcript, page 9 ) .
On

argue

again,

The Court continued the hearing until

October

17th,

defendants'
appeared

the

Motions

without

parties
to

counsel

additional time in order to hire an attorney.

gathered

in

dismiss.

The

and

for

asked

The Court ruled

that the plaintiff had had ample time within which to hire an
attorney

and proceeded

to hear the defendants' Motions.
-8-

The

Court granted defendants' Motions to dismiss on the grounds the
plaintiff had improperly filed his complaint.

(Record, page 132;

Transcript, page 14-16).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Utah

Health

Care Malpractice Act requires, as a

mandatory condition precedent to filing a malpractice suit, that
a plaintiff

first obtain a Prelitigation Panel review of his

claim.

A Complaint

process

is subject

filed prior

to the

to dismissal.

Prelitigation review

Since plaintiff

filed his

Complaint prior to the Prelitigation review process and hearing,
the lower Court properly dismissed his case.
The issues of estoppel, waiver, res judicata, collateral
estoppel

and

the

constitutionality

of

the

Utah

Health

Care

Malpractice Act are raised for the first time in this appeal and,
therefore, are not proper subjects for review.

Even if this

Court considers such issues, the Trial Court's ruling should be
affirmed because of the following:
1.

Rule

12(h)(2)

of

the

Utah

Rules of

Civil

Procedure provides that a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds can be brought at any time and is not waived by a failure
to plead the same.

-9-

2.

Defendants' Motions to dismiss are not barred

by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because
a hearing on the Motions was expressly reserved by Judge Brian.
3.

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is not

unconstitutionally

vague.

Rather, plaintiff

has

unreasonably

interpreted its provisions and has not overcome the presumption
of validity accorded to statutory enactments.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFfS
COMPLAINT BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
U.C.A. §78-14-12.

The provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
U.C.A. § 73-14-1, et seg., were designed to "provide a reasonable
time

in which

providers....and

actions may

be

commenced

against

health

provide other procedural

changes

to expedite

[the] early evaluation and settlement of claims".
14-2.

care

U.C.A. § 78-

As a part of the Act, the legislature established certain

conditions

precedent

to

the

filing

of

malpractice

lawsuits.

Under the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-14-4, a plaintiff is required
to give the prospective defendant ninety (90) days1 prior notice
of his intent to file an action.
is grounds for dismissal.

Failure to provide such notice

Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150

-10-

(Utah

1979).

In

addition,

U.C.A.

§

78-14-12

requires

the

plaintiff to request a Prelitigation Panel to review his claim
prior to filing a lawsuit.

The Prelitigation hearing process is

"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation".
(Emphasis added) U.C.A. § 78-14-12(1).
In order

to provide

a plaintiff

sufficient

time to

comply with the mandatory prerequisites as set forth above, the
legislature has enacted

provisions which toll the statute of

limitations.

to U.C.A.

Pursuant

§ 78-14-8,

the

statute of

limitations is tolled for 120 days if the notice of intent to sue
is served

within

ninety

statute of limitations.

(90) days of the expiration of the
The statute of limitations

is also

tolled while the plaintiff's claim is heard by the Prelitigation
Panel and for a period of sixty (60) days thereafter.
78-14-12.

U.C.A. §

The tolling provisions are clear in their meaning, and

allow a plaintiff ample time to complete the mandatory conditions
precedent and still file a timely claim.
In the instant case, plaintiff was entitled to file a
complaint during the sixty (60) day period following the issuance
of the Prelitigation Panel's opinion.

However, plaintiff ignored

the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-14-12 and filed his Complaint prior
to the completion of the Prelitigation review process.

His

reasons for doing so are hard to understand, in light of the
-11-

clear and unambiguous provisions of U.C.A. § 78-14-12 which toll
the statute of limitations until sixty (60) days following the
issuance

of

the

Prelitigation

Panel's opinion.

Furthermore,

plaintiff was fully aware of the tolling provisions of the Act as
is evidenced by his statement at page 18 of his brief which reads
"it appears, therefore, that the plaintiff would not be required
to file a complaint until sixty (60) days after the opinion of
the review Panel".

A similar statement is made in plaintiff's

Memorandum in opposition to defendants' first Motion to dismiss
(Exhibit "A", Page 3),
Plaintiff's
Malpractice

Act

interpretation

of

the

ignores the plain meaning

fails to consider the statute as a whole.

Utah

Health

of the statute and

As this Court stated:

...[S]tatutory enactments are to be
so construed so as to render all
parts
thereof
relevant
and
meaningful, and that interpretations
are to be avoided which render some
part of the provision nonsensical or
absurd...
Millett v. Clark Clinic
Corporation, 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah
1980) .
Plaintiff has had ample time to file a Complaint in
compliance with the Act and has been aware of defendants'
objections to his early filing since defendants filed their
first Motion to dismiss in November of 1987.
however, chose

to

ignore

the statutory
-12-

Care

Plaintiff/

requirements and

prematurely filed his Complaint.

Because of his failure to

comply with the clear and straightforward provisions of the
Act, plaintiff1s Complaint was properly dismissed.
B.

THE ISSUES OF WAIVER, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,
RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT ARE NOT PROPER QUESTIONS FOR
REVIEW.

In Utah, matters not presented to the Trial Court
by way of pleadings or otherwise cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.
(Utah

1987).

"This

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801
general

constitutional issues... ."
of Riverton, 639 P.2d

rule

applies

equally

to

Pratt v. City Council of City

172, 173-4

(Utah 1981).

Yates v.

Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980).
In his
which

were

appeal, plaintiff

never

considered

by

raises
the

several

issues

District

Court.

Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of plaintiff's "Statement of Issues"
concern

questions

of

estoppel,

waiver,

res

judicata,

collateral estoppel and the constitutionality of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act.

These issues were never argued

to the District Court nor can they be found in the record.
Because the above issues are not properly before the Court,
they should not be considered in this appeal.

-13-

Even

if

this

Court

finds

the

issues

raised

by

plaintiff are proper questions for review, the lower Court's
dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint should be upheld for the
following reasons:
1.

The defendant Howe did not waive his right to

move for dismissal*
Plaintiff

claims

defendant

Howe,

by

filing

an

Answer to plaintiff's Complaint, waived any objection to its
untimely filing.

Such a contention cannot be sustained.

Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(2)....whenever
it
appears
by
suggestion
of
the
parties
or
otherwise
that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter,
the
court
shall
dismiss
the
action. .••
A Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) can be
made at any time before or during trial.
699 P.2d

763

(Utah

1985).

Because

Smith v. Vuicich,

plaintiff

failed to

comply with the jurisdictional provisions of U.C.A. § 78-1412, Howe's Motion to dismiss was entirely proper.
2.

The defendants' second Motion to dismiss is

not barred by the doctrine of res judicata and collateral
estoppel.
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The

doctrines

of

res

judicata

and

collateral

estoppel are based on the premise that a matter fully heard
and decided should not be relitigated.

Bernard v. Attaburyf

629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981); Penrod v. New Creations Cream, 669
P.2d

873

(Utah

1983).

Plaintiff

argues that

the Order

dismissing his Complaint violates the above rules because
defendants had filed a prior Motion to dismiss on the same
grounds.

Again, plaintiff's contention cannot stand.

The

simple answer to plaintiff's argument lies in Judge Brian's
ruling on the first Motion.

Judge Brian stated:

"Defendant, Holy Cross Hospital's
motion to dismiss is continued
without date pending pre-litigation
panel
review
before
medical
malpractice
actions
are
to be
filed.
Above
motion
can be
entertained at that time if counsel
so chooses". (Exhibit "B").
It is clear the Court never did conduct a full
hearing

on the

without date.

Motion; but, rather continued

the matter

Under the circumstances, res judicata and

collateral estoppel are inapplicable.
3.

The

Utah

Health

Care

Malpractice

Act

is

constitutional.
Although the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act has
withstood

various

constitutional
-15-

challenges,

the

Utah

Supreme Court has not yet tested

the Act for vagueness.

Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah
1980) (Equal Protection).
Medical

Center,

603

McGuire v. University of Utah

P.2d

786

(Utah

1979)

(Special

Legislation); Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 63 5
P.2d 30 (Utah 1981) (Special Legislation).
In

order

for

a

statute

to

be

found

unconstitutionally vague, it must be so vague that persons
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.
County

Commissioners,

620

P.2d

Eves v. Board of Clark
1248

(Nev.

1980).

Legislative enactments, however, are accorded a presumption
of validity.

State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987).

In the instant case, plaintiff has not established
evidence

that

the

provisions

of

the

Malpractice Act are impermissibly vague.

Utah

Health

Care

Rather, plaintiff

has unreasonably interpreted the statute and has taken its
provisions out of context.
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CONCLUSION
The

plaintiff

has

unreasonably

interpreted

the

provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and, in
doing so, has failed to comply with the conditions precedent
for filing a malpractice suit.
nature
properly

of

such

dismissed

conditions,
and

the

Because of the compulsory
plaintiff's

Order of the

Complaint
District

was
Court

should be affirmed.
DATED this

g* '

day of July, 1989.

KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
JAMES B. HANKS
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent, David Howe, M.D.
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EXHIBIT "A"

GEORGE M. HALEY
HALEY St STOLEBARGER
Tenth Floor, Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-1555
DAVID R. HAMILTON
MICHAEL G. BELNAP
FARR, KAUFMAN St HAMILTON
205 - 26th Street, 034
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801) 394-5526
Attorneys for Rolando Avila

ROLANDO AVILA,

NOTICE OF INTENT TO
COMMENCE MALPRACTICE ACTION

vs.
ROBERT T. WYNN, M.D.;
HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH
AND EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D.

Rolando Avila, by and through his counsel, George M. Haley,
of Haley St Stolebarger, and David R. Hamilton and Michael
G. Belnap, of Farr, Kaufman Se Hamilton, hereby serve notice to
Robert T. Wynn, M.D., Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency
Center (hereinafter "Holy Cross Clinic"), Holy Cross Hospital
Park City Ambulance (hereinafter "Holy Cross Ambulance"), Holy
Cross Hospital and David Howe, M.D., of Mr. Avila's intention to
- 1 -

commence a medical malpractice action.
I.

NATURE OF CLAIM

Mr. Avila's claim of malpractice arises out of the medical
treatment Mr. Avila received after he dislocated his right lower
extremity in a skiing accident.

Mr. Avila fell while skiing and

hit a lift terminal, which caused the dislocation of his right
knee.

This occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 1,

1984, where the Rattler and Wizard ski runs intersect.

At the

location of the injury, he was examined by Dr. Roger Suchyta and
Dr. Ed Bronski, as well as ski patrolman Janet Stoltz.

At the

time of that examination, Mr. Avila had a palpable dorsalis pedis
pulse and posterior tibial pulse, and his foot was warm.

Based

upon the examination of the above-referenced individuals, the
extremity was immobilized by the placing of a splint; and
Mr. Avila was given 50 milligrams of Meperidine.

Based upon the

findings of the above-referenced individuals, a decision was made
not to use the helicopter to transport Mr. Avila directly to Holy
Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City; rather, he was taken by
toboggan to the bottom of the mountain and placed in the care of
Holy Cross Hospital by and through their agents, Holy Cross
Ambulance; the driver, EMT Dyer; and the EMT technician,
Shoshnik.

While the ambulance was still at Deer Valley, the

splint and ski boot were removed, and a capillary fill test was
performed.

At that point, the capillary fill time of Mr. Avila's

right big toe was within acceptable limits.
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Upon information and belief, Mr. Avila alleges that it
is the policy of Holy Cross Ambulance to transport all
Individuals picked up at Deer Valley or Park City ski resorts
directly to the Holy Cross Clinic in Park City.

Pursuant to that

policy and practice of the Holy Cross Ambulan.ce, Mr. Avila was
transported to the Holy Cross Clinic,

When Mr. Avila arrived, he

was examined by Dr. Wynn, who is a pediatrician who does not have
the requisite training and experience to handle complicated
orthopedic problems such as he was faced with in the present
circumstances.

Dr. Wynn did not refer the case to one of the

available orthopedic surgeons in Park City, nor did Dr. Wynn
immediately transfer Mr. Avila to a health care facility that had
the appropriate medical staff to deal with the condition that
Mr. Avila was in.

Dr. Wynn attempted to put the knee Mback into

place" by rotating the lower extremity in a circular motion.
During this episode, the right popliteal artery was avulsed.
Dr. Wynn was unsuccessful in his attempt to put the leg back into
place, and then ordered Mr. Avila transferred to Holy Cross
Hospital in Salt Lake City.
The foregoing episode took place on February 1, 1984, at
approximately 4:00 p.m.
Mr. Avila arrived at Holy Cross Hospital in the late
afternoon of February 1, 1984.

Upon arrival, his lower extremity

was examined by Dr. David Howe, who could find no palpable
dorsalls pedis pulse, or posterior tibial pulses, and Mr. Avila's
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foot was cold,

Mr. Avila was quickly taken to surgery, where the

dislocation of the right knee was reduced and the disruption of
the popliteal artery was disclosed.

Mr. Avila underwent a

femoral popliteal bypass grafting, utilizing the autogenous
saphenous vein from his left leg.

During the surgery, a sterile

environment was not maintained by the staff of Holy Cross
Hospital.

Further, during the post-operative period, inadequate

wound care was given to Mr. Avila, resulting in an infection in
the inferior aspect of the medial incision on the right knee, as
well as in the left proximal thigh.

As a result of the

infection, the surgery to repair Avila's anterior cruciate
ligament, sartorius tendon, medial gastroc, and semimembranosus
repair had to be postponed.
rehabilitation of Mr. Avila.

This had an adverse effect on the
Further, due to the condition of

the incisions on both legs, Mr. Avila underwent a surgery on
February 13, 1984, to remove necrosis of peri-incisional skin and
subcutaneous fat on the left thigh from the donor site.
As a result of Mr. Avila's loss of his popliteal artery and
the subsequent graft, he is placed at a risk of loss of his right
lower extremity.

Prior to the accident, Mr. Avila was a member

of the Bolivian Nation Ski Team and was in Park City, Utah,
training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games and other world-class
ski races.

Mr. Avila has been advised by Dr. Howe that he cannot

ski again due to the risk of loss of his leg.
By way of defense, Dr. Wynn claims that he had a
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consultation over the phone with Dr. Howe wherein Dr. Howe
directed Dr. Wynn to attempt to get the knee joint back into
place.
II.
A.

SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT

HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL
1.

Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance Service.
(a)

Mr. Avila alleges that it was misconduct on behalf

of the EMT's, ambulance driver or technician to remove
Mr. Avila*s boot and splint in the ambulance.
(b)

Mr. Avila alleges that under circumstances where

there is an acute dislocation of the knee, there is a risk of
pinching the popliteal artery and, as a result, the leg should be
splinted and immobilized until it can be reset by a qualified
orthopedic surgeon.
(c)

Mr. Avila further alleges that it is misconduct on

the part of Holy Cross Hospital to have a policy of transporting
patients with acute orthopedic problems to the Holy Cross Clinic
when there is not appropriate orthopedic staff on duty.
2.

Holy Cross Hospital Family Health Center.
(a)

It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Clinic

to solicit and treat Mr. Avila, who had an acute orthopedic
problem, with a member of the staff who was a pediatrician and
not trained to treat severe orthopedic conditions such as
Mr. Avila 1 s.
(b)

It was misconduct on the part of the Clinic
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to solicit and treat orthopedic patients without having an
orthopedic surgeon on call to perform that service.
!•

Holy Cross Hospital.
(a)

It was misconduct on the part of Holy Cross

Hospital to fail to maintain a sterile environment in the
operating room, which enabled the infection to occur in both
incision sites.
(b)

It was misconduct on the behalf of the staff of

Holy Cross Hospital to fail to give to Mr. Avila the appropriate
post operative wound care, which enabled the infection to take
place.
(c)

It was misconduct by the staff of Holy Cross

Hospital to fail to observe, diagnose, report and treat the
infection in Mr. Avila's extremities when they were discovered by
the Hospital staff.
(d)

It was misconduct on behalf of the Hospital to

maintain a clinic at a ski resort where they use their own
ambulance service to pick up patients like Mr. Avila, with
obvious orthopedic problems, and transport them to their own
clinic to be treated by someone other than an orthopedic surgeon.
(e)

It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Hospital

not to maintain an orthopedic surgeon at the Park City Clinic if
they were going to attempt to deal with orthopedic problems.
(f)

It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Hospital

not to train their staff members, such as Dr. Wynn, to refer
- 6 -

orthopedic problems either to an orthopedic surgeon in Park
City or, alternatively, to transfer immediately orthopedic
problems such as Mr. Avilafs to a hospital which could perform
orthopedic services.
B.

ROBERT WYNN, M.D.
1.

It was misconduct on the part of Dr. Wynn to attempt to

treat Mr. Avila, who had an obviously complicated orthopedic
problem, when Dr. Wynn was a pediatrician and not trained or
experienced in dealing with injuries such as he was faced with
with Mr. Avila.
2.

It was misconduct for Dr. Wynn not to refer Mr. Avila

immediately to an orthopedic surgeon or, alternatively,
immediately transport Mr. Avila to a health care facility which
offered orthopedic services.
3.

It was misconduct on behalf of Dr. Wynn to attempt to

put Mr. Avila 1 s knee back into place at all and, specifically, it
was misconduct to attempt to put the leg back into place by
rotating the lower portion of that extremity.
4.

It was misconduct on behalf of Dr. Wynn to remove the

splint placed on the leg.

As a result of Dr. Wynn's attempt to

rotate the lower leg and to put the same into place, the
popliteal artery was avulsed.
C.

DAVID J. HOWE, M.D.
Dr. Wynn alleges that he attempted to put the leg in place

pursuant to the verbal directions given to him by Dr. Howe
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over the telephone.

If this allegation is, in fact, correct, it

was misconduct on the part of Dr. Howe to:
1.

give verbal directions on the telephone as to how to

get the leg in place without physically examining the same.
2.

put that treatment in the hands of a pediatrician who

was not trained and did not have the experience to place an
acutely dislocated knee back into place.
3.

fail to direct Dr. Wynn to refer Dr. Avila to an

orthopedic specialist in the Park City area or, alternatively, to
have Mr. Avila immediately transported to a health care facility
which offered orthopedic services.
III.

AVILA'S INJURIES AND DAMAGES

Mr. Avilafs injuries are as follows:
1.

Loss of the popliteal artery, with the increased risk

of loss of the limb due to the vein graft.
2.

Neurological damage; i.e., numbness, in the right leg

due *-c probable nerve damage which occurred during Dr. Wynn's
abortive attempt at relocating the knee.
3.

The scarring which occurred on the left leg due to the

vein grafting.
4.

The scarring and loss of tissue occurring as a result

of the second surgery to remove the necrotic skin as subcutaneous
fat and other tissue.
5.

The decrease in function of both extremities due to the

vein graft and the nerve damage.
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IV.

DAMAGES

In addition to the foregoing injuries, Mr. Avila was damaged
due to the actions of the above-referenced health care providers
in the following particulars:
1.

Mr. Avila was a member of the Bolivian National Ski

Team and was in training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games, as
well as other national and international meets, at the time of
the accident.
is over.

As a result of the vein graft, his skiing career

Had the popliteal artery not been pinched and the knee

had been put into place appropriately, Mr. Avila would still have
been able to ski competitively.
2.
bypass.

Risk of loss of lower extremity due to the vein
Mr. Avila has a risk that should he injure his leg

again, he could lose his leg.
3.

The pain and suffering associated with undergoing the

two unnecessary surgeries; i.e., the vein graft surgery which
occurred on February 2, 1984, and the surgery to remove the
necrotic tissue on February 14, 1984.
4.

Due to the possibility of injuring the artery in his

leg, and the decreased function of the leg and its accompanying
effect on Mr. Avila's lifestyle, Mr. Avila can no longer play
active sports, such as soccer, tennis, etc.
5.

Pain and suffering associated with the infections and

recovery from the unnecessary surgery.
6.

The costs of the extended stay in the hospital due to
• 9 -

the infection.
7.

Numbness in the legs and feet.

8.

Loss of the opportunity to ski in the 1988 Winter

Olympic Games.

Mr. Avila was assured a spot on the Bolivian

National Team for the 1988 Olympics.

By simply being a member of

the Olympic Team, he would become a national hero.

Mr. Avila had

the talent and potential to become a world-class skier in the top
levels of that competition.

Due to his injuries, he was deprived

of that opportunity, with the accompanying loss of the
opportunity for lucrative endorsements, etc.
You are hereby directed to notify your attorney and/or
insurance carrier of this Notice of Intent to Commence
Malpractice Action in order to notify the Department of Business
Regulations to schedule a prelitigation medical malpractice
hearing panel.
DATED this 31st day of January, 1986.
HALEY Sc STOLEBARGER

GEORGE (Ms, H A L E t f J 1
Attorney-^ for Rolando A\/ila
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EXHIBIT "B"

HALEY & STOLEBARGER
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
TENTH FLOOR WALKER CENTER
175 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8-4IIMOS©
•
TELEPHONE <500 531-1005

A. HALEY
- STOLEBAROER
W APPEL

o r COUNSEL
FRANK E. MOSS

REQUEST FOR PRELITIGATION PANEL REVIEW
March 4, 1986
3wen Rowley
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
REGULATIONS - DOPL
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
RE:

Robert T. Winn, M.D.; Holy Cross Family
Health and Emergency Center; Holy Cross
Hospital Park City Ambulance; Holy Cross
Hospital; David Howe, M.D.

Dear Ms. Rowley:
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated $78-14-12, please be advised
that this letter constitutes a formal request on behalf of my
client, Rolando Avila, for a prelitigation panel review of
his intended medical malpractice action against Robert T. Winn,
M.D., Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency Center, Holy Cross
Hospital Park City Ambulance, Holy Cross Hospital, and David
Howe, M.D. Per your request, I enclose herewith five copies of
this letter, together with six copies ot our Notice of Intent to
Sue, and photocopies of our proofs of service thereof.
I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest
convenience; and in the meantime, should you require anything
further in this regard, please give me a call.
Very truly yours,
HALEY 8c STOLEBARGER

edrge MT^Haley
:smw
Enclosures
cc All defendants
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EXHIBIT "C"

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Heber M. W e l l s B u i l d i n g
160 E a s t 3 0 0 S o u t h , P . O . Box 4 5 8 0 2
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84145
Telephone:
(801) 530-6730
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA,

Case No- PR-86-03-007
Petitioner,
PANEL OPINION

-VS-

HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND
EMERGENCY CENTER,
Respondent

Appearances:
George M. HaleyDavid W. Slagle

For the Petitioner
For the Respondent

BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:

<1)

MERITORIOUS

(2)

NON-MERITORIOUS

<3)

Dated this

did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)

day of

2nd

December

J*
c^^xC

o

2*lgi;iijL.

•

fc-"

•:

,.

/rf/\/'-

,, 1986

/

I

<vT?9-£-<_ •

jfe ^z_/<'.£•

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS
JULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6 730
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA,

Case No. PR-86-03-OO7
Petitioner,

-vs-

PANEL OPINION

DAVID HOWE, M.D.,
Respondent

Appearances:
George M. HaleyWilliam E. Barrett

For the Petitioner
For the Respondent

BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day* of
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence *ras offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:

(1)

MERITORIOUS

<2)

NON-MERITORIOUS

(3)

Dated this

did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)

2nd

day of

_, 1986

December

'(Udt^^^^

€/^.^.^

A#

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS . GULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone; (801) 530-6 730
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVI LA,

Case No. PR-86-03-OO7
Petitioner,

:

-vs-

PANEL OPINION

ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.
Respondent

:

Appearances:
George M. Haley
David H. Epperson

For the Petitioner
For the Respondent

BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D*, and
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters itfs Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is;

(1)
(2)

MERITORIOUS
^

(3)

Dated this

NON-MERITORIOUS
did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)
2nd

day of

., 1986

December

^H^A_

y^>/^

iti,/

/

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS x.._JULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone; (801) 530-6730
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA,

Case No. PR-86-03-OO7
Petitioner,
PANEL OPINION

-vsHOLY CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE,
Respondent

Appearances:
George M. Haley
David W. Slagle

For the Petitioner
For the Respondent

BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it f s Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:

<1)

MERITORIOUS

(2)

NON-MERITORIOUS

<3)

Dated this

did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)

2nd

day of

t?f,Y<

, 1986

December

<17<''S'''

- /

^

>

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS . ,GULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6730
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA,

Case No. PR-86-03-OO7
Petitioner,
PANEL OPINION

-vsHOLY CROSS HOSPITAL
Respondent

Appearances:
George M. Haley
David W. Slagle

For the Petitioner
For the Respondent

BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:

MERITORIOUS

(1)
(2)

1 ^

(3)

Dated this

NON-MERITORIOUS
did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)

2nd

day of

, 1986

December

£t±

fC^j-cuj\

rfSufW/*../-

///X

P R O O F

OF

S E R V I__C_J?

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing PANEL OPINIONS and
AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE on all parties of record in this proceeding by mailing
a copy, properly addressed, with postage prepaid to:

George M. Haley
Attorney at Law
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
Tenth Floor Walker Center
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1956
David W. Slagle
Attorney at Law
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P,0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
William W- Barrett
Attorney at Law
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
David H. Epperson
Attorney at Law
HANSEN, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
176 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 8th day of December, 1986.

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing

U^V'VV

Gwen B. Rowley
Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
;
Commission Expiring: 2-8-90

EXHIBIT "D"

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City. Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6628
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA

Case No. PR-86-03-007
Petitioner,
NOTIFICATION OF
PANEL OPINION

-vsDAVID HOWE, M.D.
Respondent,

Appearances
For the Petitioner
For the Respondent
BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of July,
1988, before Kevin Jackson, Joseph Cramer, Richard Owen Hurt, Charles P. Bean,
Joseph Thalman, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:

(1)
(2)

MERITORIOUS
X

NON-MERITORIOUS

(3) "OvtfBBr-did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)
Dated this

6th

day of July, 1988

MERITORIOUS

NON
MERITORIOUS
/
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone. (801) 530-6628
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

Case No. PR-86-03-OO7

ROLANDO AVILA
Petitioner,

NOTIFICATION OF
PANEL OPINION

-vsROBERT T. WINN, M.D.,
Respondent,

Appearances.
For the Petitioner
For the Respondent
BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of July,
1988, before Kevin Jackson, Joseph Cramer, Richard Owen Hurt, Charles P. Bean,
Joseph Thalman, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:
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(3) Qafe»r did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box A5802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6628
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA

Case No. PR-86-03-007
Petitioner,

-vs-

NOTIFICATION OF
PANEL OPINION

HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL,
Respondent,

Appearances:
For the Petitioner
For the Respondent
BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of July,
1988, before Kevin Jackson, Joseph Cramer, Richard Owen Hurt, Charles P. Bean,
Joseph Thalman, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:

(1)
(2)

MERITORIOUS
^

NON-MERITORIOUS

(3) WiB*r did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)
Dated this

6th

day of July, 1988
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6628
BEFORE THE DIVISION OE OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH
ROLANDO AVILA

Case No. PR-86-03-007
Petitioner,
NOTIFICATION OF
PANEL OPINION

-vs~
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE,
Respondent,

Appearances:
For the Petitioner
For the Respondent
BY THE PANEL:
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of July,
1988, before Kevin Jackson, Joseph Cramer, Richard Owen Hurt, Charles P. Boan,
Joseph Thalman, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:
(1)
(2)

MERITORIOUS
<^

NON-MERITORIOUS

(3) (Ust«eii did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)
Dated this

6th

day of July, 1988
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 530-6628
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH

ROLANDO AVILA

Case No. PR-86-03-007
Petitioner,
NOTIFICATION OF
PANEL OPINION

-vsHOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND
EMERGENCY CENTER,
Respondent,

Appearances:
For the Petitioner
For the Respondent
BY THE PANEL:
The above- entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of July,
1988, before Kevin Jackson, Joseph Cramer, Richard Owen Hurt, Charles P. Bean,
Joseph Thalman, prclitigation panel members all designated in that regard
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules
of procedure promulgated relative thereto.
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter.
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the
request for prelitigation review is:

(1)
(2)

MERITORIOUS
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NON-MERITORIOUS

(3) Bt'Ll W- did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable)
Dated this
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OPINION OF THE PANEL

The opinion that follows is applicable to all parties
named in this proceeding.
The Petitioner, Yolando Avila no doubt is a world class
skiier. Unfortunately, his athletic career was terminated
as a result of a skiing accident in the early part of
February of 1984 in which his knee was severely dislocated*
The dislocation is of such a rare type and severity that
relatively few cases of this type are reported.
The time involved between the moment the accident
occurred, (approximately 3:00 p.m.), until he was in surgery
at Holy Cross hospital is remarkably short. The evidence
clearly indicates that he was on the hill until 3:40 p.m.
and was therefore in the care of the physicians who are
named as respondents in this case only after this point in
time.
This time period is remarkably short, which also
leads to the fine results of the treatment rendered by all
concerned,.
The Petitioner in this case has a duty to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a meritorious claim
exists. A meritorious claim exists when there is a set of
facts presented which, if believed, would indicate that the
health care providers deviated from the standard of care
that was required under the circumstances. In addition, the
Petitioner must also prove that the acts of the health care
providers in some way aggravated his injury or prolonged the
nature of his suffering. This the Petitioner has failed to
do. His lawyer's efforts are clear, but the case is decided
on the nodical facts presented and which are not materially
disputed.
Mr. Avila came under the care of Dr. Howe through Dr.
Winn upon the petitioner's at arrival of the Emergency
Center.
Therefore, Dr. Winn, who
holds
substantial
experience in sports accidents, rendered medical assistance
to the Petitioner at that time, but not prior thereto. Dr.
Howe also commenced his care at this point in time. This is
not disputed or disputible.
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However, the injury sustained by the Petitioner is
directly traceable to the accident and not to any acts or
omissions of the health care providers.
Immediately upon
dislocation of the Petitioner's knee, the arteries and blood
veins were severely stretched and no doubt damaged, if at
all at that time.
The nerves, over the passage of time,
would also show some damage in that they are no longer
function.
The manipulation by Dr. Winn at the request of
Dr. Howe, was intended to reduce the risk of further damage
to the nerve.
The damage to the blood vessel, if it
occurred at all, was already manifested or would shortly
manifest itself.
The case does not turn on whether or not a pulse was
present at the time the injury was sustained.
In all
likeliness, the pulse was present for a short period of
time, but due to the severity of the injury, the pulse, in
all probability would have been lost, notwithstanding any
acts by the paramedics or the physicians.
In fact, the
subsequent surgery was the ultimate and necessary medical
course of action.
The medical literature indicates that
this type of injury can and often does result in amputation.
In any event, the presence of the pulse (or the absence of
it) is not the definitive medical criteria in determining
the extent of the injuries which are going to occur as a
result of the dislocation.
The pulse is lost in the lower extremities of the body
as a result of the blood clots in the veins which occur
because of the dislocation and not by the removal of any
boots.
However, the standard of care is not to remove
splints or boots.
There is absolutely no evidence which
indicates that the removal of the boots contributed in any
way to the injuries that were ultimately suffered by the
Petitioner, nor did it prolong his suffering.
The loss of sensation in the Petitioner's extremities
is evidence of the severe nerve damage which Dr. Winn and
Dr. Howe were trying
to mitigate when the Petitioner
presented himself for treatment. A bad result is not in and
of itself, evidence of negligence.
On the contrary, the
remarkable results that were achieved are evidence that the
health care providers did in fact render extraordinary
medical care, under the circumstances.
any

The hospital's actions did not in any way contribute to
injury
suffered
by the Petitioner.
The risk of
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infection
is
normally
associated
with
any
surgical
procedure. A hospital or a physician becomes responsible
for infections only when their actions contribute to or
enhance the risk of those normally associated with the
procedure itself. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate
that this has occurred in this case. At best, the evidence
is marginal in quality as to this issue.
In all respects, the evidence indicates that the health
care providers did not deviate from the standard of care
that was required under the circumstances.
Their care
satisfied the standard of care and even more.
The case is without merit because the Petitioner has
failed to carry his burden of proof.
DATED the

DicVIII

A-CLday of July, 1988.

P R O O F

OF

S E R V I C E

I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
COMPLIANCE and OPINION OF THE PANEL on all parties of record in this
proceeding by mailing a copy, certified, properly addressed, with postage
prepaid to:

George M. Haley
HALEY & STOLEBARGER
Walker Center, 10th Floor
175 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1956
Elizabeth King Brennan
SNOW, CHRISTLNSFN & MAR11NEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
David H. Epperson
HANSEN, DUNN, EPPERSON & DUNN
176 South West Temple, Suite 650
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
William W. Barrett
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of July, 1988

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION
Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing

tcjw^

>retta Jiron
/J
Prelitigation Secretary
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in Civil

No.

each of t h e

880482, t h i s

day of J u l y ,

1989,

to

following:

C h a r l e s C. Brown
J e f f r e y B. Brown
Budge W. C a l l
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA, P.C.
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P . O . Box 45000
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84145

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
JAMES B. HANKS
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent David Howe, M.D.

